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Biometric Identity 
Assessing the promises and dangers of biometric identity plans. 
the physical person—showing up for 
work, or presenting herself at an ATM, 
or seeking health benefits from a gov-
ernment clinic—can be connected to 
her identity and description in the da-
tabase. The U.S. plan has been the pet 
project of a few senators for years, but 
has never become law. The govern-
ment of India, by contrast, has invest-
ed 50 billion rupees (US$775,000,000) 
in its project and has collected bio-
metric information from 800 million 
people so far. That country’s Supreme 
Court, though, is currently pondering 
the constitutionality of the plan.
Are plans like these desirable? 
They present some policy advantages; 
biometric identification techniques 
enable governments to achieve cer-
tain popularly supported goals more 
successfully. In the U.S., the law for-
bids employers to hire people who 
are in the country illegally or on tem-
porary visas, unless the Department 
of Homeland Security has granted 
them work authorization. But wheth-
er a person at a particular moment 
has legal work authorization (or legal 
immigration status) is not apparent 
when looking at her; the information 
resides in a database in Washington, 
D.C. She may present government-
issued documents, but those docu-
T
HR E E  Y E A R S AG O,  the U.S. 
Senate passed a comprehen-
sive immigration reform 
bill. The drafters of that bill 
pushed for a requirement 
that every employed person in the 
U.S.—whether citizen or noncitizen, 
native-born or immigrant—should 
have to get a federal government-is-
sued ID card. The holder’s biometric 
information, either fingerprints or 
a different technology, would be en-
crypted on the card. Every time a U.S. 
worker took a new job, the employer 
would take her fingerprints or other 
biometric, so as to check her physical 
characteristics against the informa-
tion on the card. If the biometric in-
formation matched, it would establish 
the job applicant was the card’s right-
ful bearer. The employer would then 
transmit the identity information on 
the card to a central database, to verify 
she was legally authorized to work. In 
the end, though, the drafters dropped 
the ID card proposal from the bill.
In India, the government is under-
taking to assign to residents 1.2 bil-
lion unique “Aadhaar” ID numbers, 
linked to each person’s biometrics—
photograph, 10 fingerprints, and two 
iris scans. The government aims to 
make use and verification of one’s 
Aadhaar number an inseparable part 
of daily life. The card is accepted as 
identification and proof of address 
for banking purposes; authorities 
are pushing forward with plans to 
use Aadhaar to scrub voting lists; 
and a host of government agencies 
are making it mandatory under their 
programs, all notwithstanding an in-
terim order by India’s Supreme Court 
forbidding such requirements.
Both of these stories involve da-
tabases with two features. First, they 
include entries for all or the vast ma-
jority of a country’s residents. Sec-
ond, there is a mechanism to tie the 
data entries to the subjects’ biometric 
characteristics, which can be checked 
or verified in the field. In that way, 
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Biometric  
information helps 
connect abstract 
legal status to the 
physical individual.
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tabases, though, is also problematic. 
Consider the main episodes in U.S. 
history where government not only 
issued biometric ID, but required 
persons to carry that ID. Before the 
Civil War, free blacks were some-
times required to carry certificates 
that recited their names and employ-
ers and included the mid-19th-century 
version of biometrics: they described 
the worker’s physical characteristics, 
including such matters as age, com-
plexion, build, height, and scars. A 
free black without adequate identi-
fication risked being arrested or en-
slaved. After 1892, U.S. law required 
all Chinese persons in the U.S. to carry 
“certificates of residence” validating 
their immigration status, on penalty 
of deportation. Congress mandated 
that each card contained the holder’s 
photograph; that biometric, said a 
senator, was “the only effective meth-
od” for identifying Chinese migrants.
When the U.S. government next 
told a group of people they had to carry 
cards with biometric identifiers at all 
times, it was 1952. The card in ques-
ments may be somebody else’s; tak-
ing her biometric information helps 
connect abstract legal status to the 
physical individual.
Pakistan was able to rely on biomet-
ric (fingerprint-based) ID cards to pro-
vide reconstruction grants to families 
affected by severe flooding, without 
too much money going astray. Some 
countries take voters’ biometric data in 
order to de-duplicate voting lists (that 
is, to ensure single individuals do not 
appear on voter registration lists mul-
tiple times). Integration of biometric 
identification into the system for pay-
ing government employees in Nigeria 
is said to have helped uncover more 
than 60,000 “ghost workers.”
More generally, people need some 
way of verifying their identity so gov-
ernments will provide them with 
services and businesses will enter 
into relationships with them. Gov-
ernments want satisfactory proof of 
identity, and often proof of residency 
or citizenship (which in turn is predi-
cated on proof of identity) before they 
provide payments such as pension or 
welfare benefits, or allow individuals 
to vote, or grant passports or regis-
ter property transfers. Private actors 
require people to verify their identity 
before they can take such steps as 
opening a bank account, renting an 
apartment, or cashing a check.
In the industrialized West, these 
concerns have been addressed pri-
marily through birth registration: 
Children are registered with the state 
at birth, and are entitled to docu-
ments as proof. They can use those 
documents to get others such as 
driver’s licenses and passports. All of 
those documents, tied to an entry in 
some official database, can be used 
to verify the holder’s identity. But in 
some poorer countries that does not 
work, because as many as 70% of all 
births go unregistered. That is why 
projects like Aadhaar, in a variety of 
less-industrialized countries, are ex-
ploring the use of biometrics as a way 
of tying individuals directly into iden-
tity-verifying databases.
The connection of our physical 
bodies to entries in government da-
An employee uses an Aadhaar-based entry system to verify identity at a building in New Delhi, India.
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base; rather, their plan was that bio-
metrics would be stored only on indi-
viduals’ cards, to be checked against 
their physical characteristics using 
card readers in the field. That way, 
central government authorities would 
not have access to the biometrics at 
all. The Aadhaar plan, by contrast, 
does not rely on cards: biometrics are 
stored centrally so a person’s merely 
presenting his fingerprints identifies 
him to the system.  
Another approach avoiding some 
risks would tie citizens’ biometrics 
only to limited-purpose databases—
designed for particular functions and 
not calling up other information in 
the government’s possession—rath-
er than to an all-encompassing da-
tabase (or a linked set of databases) 
containing multiple classes of infor-
mation. Such functional structures 
can be less expensive than multipur-
pose identity platforms (although 
not if a country ends up establishing 
multiple, separate biometric systems 
serving separate goals). Some coun-
tries, for example, have done biomet-
ric registration for the limited pur-
pose of enabling voting in national 
elections. But limited-purpose bio-
metric identity plans can find their 
focus shifting; in several countries 
that have set up single-purpose voter 
registration systems, the voter reg-
istration card has become a de facto 
national ID card. In the U.S., the So-
cial Security number, created for a 
limited purpose, rapidly became a 
unique common identifier.
It is important to be mindful of the 
substantial privacy risks associated 
with biometric identity plans. This 
does not mean they are always a bad 
idea; in a country where many individu-
als have no means of identity verifica-
tion at all, some form of appropriately 
structured biometric identification 
system can make people better off. But 
we have not done well in the past in the 
U.S. imposing biometric ID require-
ments, and—given the strength of our 
existing systems for identity verifica-
tion—the risks (and costs) of any such 
plan in the U.S. would likely far out-
weigh the benefits. 
Jonathan T. Weinberg (weinberg@wayne.edu) is a 
Professor of Law at Wayne State University in Detroit, MI.  
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tion was the “green card” issued to 
noncitizen residents in the U.S.; the 
motivation was fear of the Communist 
threat. Congress members, worrying 
that outsiders sympathetic to enemy 
countries would act as a fifth column, 
mandated that all noncitizens carry 
their immigration documentation 
wherever they went. That law is still on 
the books today.
That is not a confidence-inspiring 
record. When U.S. law has imposed 
requirements that certain people 
carry biometric ID at all times, it has 
been so a target could be required to 
show a document linking him to a da-
taset telling law enforcement officers 
whether to enslave, detain, or deport 
him. That is the promise and the dan-
ger of biometric ID systems. ID sys-
tems without a biometric component 
have limited law-enforcement value, 
because they lack good mechanisms 
by means of which police can connect 
the persons standing in front of them 
to the documents they produce. Bio-
metric ID systems enable better iden-
tification, but more effective policing 
carries risks of its own.
It is perhaps not coincidental, 
then, that modern U.S. thinking in-
corporates a severe allergy to anything 
that looks like a biometric national 
ID card. Americans have accepted the 
Social Security number, which in prac-
tice serves as a unique common identi-
fier linking them to entries in a variety 
of federal and private databases. They 
have accepted a requirement that they 
carry—and often produce—driver’s 
licenses while driving. But they need 
not carry or display driver’s licenses at 
other times, and driver’s licenses do 
not display a unique common iden-
tifier that could reliably identify the 
holder across federal databases. In 
particular, it is illegal for a driver’s li-
cense or any other state-issued identi-
fication document to display the hold-
er’s Social Security number.
Besides the baseline concerns as-
sociated with police being able to eas-
ily and effectively identify citizens, 
one can identify a wide range of more 
nuanced risks flowing from govern-
ment identity systems’ coming to rely 
on biometric identifiers and a central 
database in some manner associated 
with them. One risk relates to data se-
curity: Can the government keep this 
information safe, avoiding either pri-
vacy breaches or identity theft? One 
of the claims made by plaintiffs in 
the Aadhaar litigation is that data se-
curity for the submitted information 
is unacceptably weak. A second risk 
relates to the damage done by (the 
inevitable) bad information in the 
database, especially if use of the card 
or biometrics becomes ubiquitous. 
Will the database become so useful 
it is treated as presumptively correct, 
with bad information difficult or im-
possible to change? Intentionally 
planting bad information would then 
be an excellent route to identity theft 
or worse.
Another concern: To the extent the 
use of a biometric or card to verify iden-
tity becomes routine in everyday trans-
actions, it would be easy to structure 
the system so each use of the card adds 
information to the relevant databases. 
That would fatten the data portfolios 
maintained on each citizen and would 
limit individuals’ ability to undertake 
everyday activities free of surveillance. 
Finally, the government might gain 
leverage over the citizenry through 
its power to revoke or limit the use of 
card or biometric data to verify iden-
tity—what happens when government 
decides to flag the database entries of 
undesirable citizens so their biomet-
rics or cards can no longer be used to 
obtain services?
The implementation details of any 
biometric identity plan are key. The 
designers of the proposed U.S. worker 
ID plan, thus, sought to forestall ob-
jections by ensuring no biometrics 
would be stored in the central data-
It is important to be 
mindful of  
the substantial 
privacy risks 
associated  
with biometric 
identity plans.
